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ABSTRACT  
   
Political party identification has an immense influence on shaping individual 
attitudes and processes of reasoning to the point where otherwise knowledgeable people 
endorse political conspiracies that support one's political in-group and simultaneously 
disparage an out-group. Although recent research has explored this tendency among 
partisans, less is known about how Independents respond in comparison. Previous 
research fails to identify the Independent as a unique type of voter, but rather categorizes 
this group as ostensibly partisan, not a separate phenomenon to investigate. However, 
most Independents purport neutrality and, by recent polls, are becoming a substantial 
body worthy of concerted focus. Many questions arise about who Independents really are. 
For example, do all who identify as Independent behave in a similar manner? Are 
Independents ideologically different than what is represented by a partisan label? Is the 
Independent category a broad term for something entirely misunderstood? A thorough 
investigation into the greater dynamics of the political environment in the United States is 
an enormous undertaking, requiring a robust interdisciplinary approach beyond the focus 
and intent of this study. Therefore, this study begins the journey toward understanding 
these phenomena; do Independents, as a whole, uniformly respond to statements about 
political conspiracy theories? To explore these possibilities, explicit responses are 
bypassed to evaluate the implicit appeal of political conspiracy theories. An action 
dynamics (mouse-tracking) approach, a data rich method that records the response 
process, demonstrates Independents are not in fact a homogenous group, but rather seem 
to fall into two groups: non-partisan leaning and partisan leaning. The analysis exposes 
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that relative to the baseline and control stimuli: (1) Non-leaning Independents reveal an 
increased susceptibility to implicitly endorse bi-partisan directed conspiracy theories 
when compared to leaners. (2) Republican-leaners demonstrate a stronger susceptibility 
to endorse right-wing aligned conspiracy theories (against Barack Obama), similar to 
Republican partisans. (3) Democrat-leaners, unlike Democrat partisans, do not 
demonstrate any particular susceptibility to implicitly endorse either right/left-wing 
aligned conspiracy theories (against Barack Obama or George W. Bush). Drawing from 
major theories from social, political, and cognitive psychology will contribute to an 
understanding of these phenomena. Concluding remarks include study limitations and 
future directions. 
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DEDICATION  
   
To the cowboy and the rainbow. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Partisanship, the political party to which one is oriented, both influences and is 
influenced by individual attitudes, beliefs, needs and motivations. People identify with a 
political party because the party values align with their individual ideology. In this 
context, Denzau and North (1994) elucidate ideology as the shared framework of mental 
models used to interpret the environment, which acts as a guide for appropriately 
structuring the environment. Additionally, Converse (1964/2006) refers to ideology as 
ideas and attitudes held together by salient interdependence. Furthermore, ideology both 
echoes and strengthens a person’s interpersonal, informational and existential needs (Jost, 
Federico, & Napier, 2009). In essence, a person’s ideology reflects the worldview 
through which all else is interpreted. Partisanship, then, is an extension of this ideology 
because party identification provides the basis for understanding political information, 
and consequently, impacts political decision-making and behavior (Twenge, Honeycutt, 
Prislin, & Sherman, 2016). For example, the Republican Party is generally thought to 
represent a conservative ideology while the Democrat Party is aligned with a liberal 
ideology. Partisanship is the reflection of an ideological self-categorization (liberal vs. 
conservative) and membership in a social group comprises an important part of an 
individual’s self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
 In The American Voter, Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) described 
political identity as being fairly stable over an individual’s lifetime, and asserted 
Independents behaved like partisans and subsequently, were not really interesting as a 
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separate group. In The Myth of the Independent Voter, Keith (1992), identified pure 
Independents (i.e. non-partisan leaning) as being different than partisan leaning 
Independents (i.e. Republican-leaning, Democrat-leaning), but mostly failed to make a 
strong case for why this would be true (Kamieniecki, 1993). However, Brewer (2001) 
described social identity, such a partisanship, as more fluid and dynamic. A 2015 poll 
conducted by Jones indicated 43% of Americans claim to be Independent, up from 36% 
in 1988. With the numbers rising each year, are Independent voters any different now 
than they were 55 years ago? Has the two-party system finally reached its peak of salient 
meaning? Is an adjustment necessary to more accurately reflect a diversified ideology? 
Or is something else at play? Knowing the answers to these questions might help us to 
better understand voting behavior, improve election predictions and by extension, help to 
shape the future landscape of American sociopolitical environment (Twenge et al., 2016). 
It is this curiosity that led to the current quest to delve deeper into the minds of modern-
day Independents.  
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Chapter 2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 To understand the rationale and design of the current study, it is helpful to 
elaborate on some of the important theories from social, political, and cognitive 
psychology that contribute to this research. 
Conspiracy Ideation: Belief in Conspiracy Theories  
 Despite the advancements in science and education, conspiracy theorists continue 
to successfully spin their stories to a modern-day audience. This is because, as 
Zuckerman (2005) found, endorsement provides psychological and emotional benefits 
even when outright endorsement is perceived as less socially desirable. Proponents of 
conspiracy theories then, appear to experience a paradox between what they want to 
believe, and what they feel is socially appropriate to believe. Perhaps this is why some 
secretly (implicitly) support ideologically aligned partisan conspiracy theories, while 
shying away from outwardly (explicitly) doing so. It is this competition between the 
implicit and explicit political opinions that this study intends to understand. To get at 
these hidden cognitive processes, the dynamic research method (computer mouse 
tracking) provides valuable insight. 
 Before delving into discussion on the paradox of conspiracy theory endorsement, 
it is important to clarify and differentiate the use of terms in this study related to the word 
conspiracy. The following are understood and defined as: 
  Conspiracy theory: stories or explanations based upon unsubstantiated evidence 
 Conspiracy ideation: belief in conspiracy theory/theories 
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 True Conspiracy: stories or explanations based upon substantiated evidence (i.e. 
the Watergate scandal).  
 As conspiracy theories are based upon unsubstantiated evidence, conspiracy 
ideation may be viewed as socially undesirable. However, Bost (2015) discussed 
conspiracy ideation as not relegated to clinical psychopathology, but rather as a part of 
normal thinking that all humans do. When people are exposed to environmental events 
that trigger feelings of vulnerability, the innate human strategies that promote survival are 
activated. One such strategy is suspicion about the motives of another’s actions. As such, 
suspicion is an adaptive trait intended to ensure even-handed social transactions. Without 
a healthy dose of suspicion, a person may become a vulnerable target for predatory 
offenders. Therefore, as a protective mechanism, responding to feelings of heightened 
levels of powerlessness, alienation, and diminishing trust in institutions, the cognitive 
processes employed to deal with uncertain risk may be viewed as a rational, defensive 
stance. As motivated reasoning theory supports, feelings of anxiety, when one is 
uncertain about the exact source of the perceived threat, stimulate information seeking 
behavior (i.e. heightened sensitive to informational sources), and results in enhanced 
pattern-seeking. Likewise, Shermer (2012) found that people prefer patterns that include 
false alarms to the possibility of missing an actual threat. This behavior is enhanced when 
people feel vulnerable and their sense of control over life events is threatened (Whitson & 
Galinsky, 2008). Swami (2012) found that belief in politically related conspiracy 
theories, however, are not predictive of a worldview that is generalized by conspiracy 
ideation. This is to say that one may not typically believe in most conspiracy theories, but 
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may be prone to consider them in a specific context. For example, feelings of 
vulnerability increase when the political ideology or group to which one ascribes is not 
represented by the currently elected political elites (i.e. President of the United States) 
(Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999). This experience facilitates the allure 
to endorse politically directed conspiracy theories as a means to bring clarity to, and 
make sense of, current events in a manner that is also psychologically beneficial. To 
elucidate the manner in which the sense of personal identity is coupled with one’s social 
environment, this discussion now looks to several major theories from social psychology. 
The Power of Identity and Group Processes 
 One of the core tenants in social psychology is the functional interdependence of 
people and their social environment. In order to study the nature of cognitive processes, 
the mind must not be uncoupled from the world (Turner and Oakes, 1994). According to 
Jost, et al. (2009), ideology reflects and reinforces a person’s interpersonal, informational 
and existential needs. Group membership is based upon shared ideology. People move 
into groups that reflect similar attitudes and ideas, and out of groups that do not 
(Hornsey, 2008). Group membership is a reflection of an ideological self-categorization 
that provides a framework for understanding and orienting to the social environment 
while contributing to individual self-concept (Tajfel & Turner 1979). Furthermore, 
political polarization creates a readily identifiable party that makes group identification 
easier. This is because groups become more distinctive when within-group similarities 
are enhanced and between-group differences are exaggerated (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, & 
Reicher, 1987). Although Campbell et al. (1960) described political identity as stable 
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over an individual’s lifetime, Brewer (1991) opined that identification with a group can 
be somewhat dynamic in response to situational factors. When it comes to the immense 
influence of political party identification, two theories from social psychology are critical 
in understanding the importance of self-identity, group processes and intergroup 
relations: (1) social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and (2) self-categorization 
theory (Turner et al., 1987). 
 Social Identity Theory. To adequately discuss social identity theory, it is 
important to begin upon the foundation of personal identity as the basis from which social 
identity theory was first described by Tajfel and Turner (1979). Social identity theory 
(SIT) maintains the primacy of the group above that of the individual as responsible for 
social conflict and change. People are able to manage their sense of self via group 
memberships and are generally concerned with creating a positive image in doing so. 
This requires a comparative association be made between the group to which one 
belongs, and those groups that are different. Conferring a superior social identity to one’s 
own group (in-group) is enhanced by regarding the comparative group (out-group) as 
inferior, negative, or unsatisfactory (Sindic & Condor, 2014). Likewise, people form 
positive opinions about groups that uphold their personal ideological beliefs (Brandt, 
Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014). Social identity is an extension of 
personal identity and an essential aspect of partisanship. Group members are motivated 
and expected to support the groups with which they identify (Conover, 1988; Greene  
2004). Partisanship, consequently, influences one’s interpretation of political information 
(Bolsen, Druckman & Cook, 2013). SIT maintains that people will move into groups that 
   7 
are more satisfactory as much as they believe it is possible for them to do so. Moreover, 
when people are engaged in identity management, they are likely to adopt strategies to 
cope with the perception of an inferior status, which can lead to collective action (Sindic 
& Condor, 2014). Though the lens of SIT, the motivation of group membership is the 
cornerstone on which a democratic society depends. 
 Social Categorization Theory. Social categorization theory extends SIT by 
refining the personal and social identities as dynamic and existing along a continuum 
between interpersonal and intergroup self-categorization (Turner & Reynolds, 2012). 
According to self-categorization theory (SCT), the self is defined not only by personal 
and social identities, but also includes aspects of a collective identity that reflects group 
membership (Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Onorato, 1999). To clarify, SCT argues that 
the categories to which one belongs, both as an individual and as a group member, are 
variable and oriented in the social environment in a dynamic and reciprocal process 
(Turner & Reynolds, 2012).  This is because one’s personal identity is tied to and reflects 
the characteristics (e.g. emotions and attitudes) of the group, which in turn contributes to 
and defines self-concept. Therefore, emotionally and cognitively, humans are not merely 
individuals, but are the sum of their environment. For this reason, people have affective 
reactions to social groups, particularly when they believe their position on important 
issues is correct. Because political opinions are also governed by moral judgment, 
heightened emotions (i.e., fear, anger, hatred) often influence reasoning and decision-
making (Brandt, et al., 2014; Haidt, 2001; Liu & Ditto, 2012). 
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 Partisanship and Group Identity. As social identity theory and self-
categorization theory suggest, people are likely to follow those who they believe to be 
dependable, trustworthy, and who are perceived to be similar to themselves (Zuckerman, 
2005). People demonstrate more intolerance toward dissimilar groups than to those they 
perceive to share similar attributes. In the case of politics, should negative views about 
one’s own party develop, people compensate by acquiring even more negative views of 
the competing party (Groenendyk, 2013). In this way, people seek to strengthen the 
perception of ideological superiority and group commitment. At times, the intent to 
legitimize one’s own political ideology leads to the incorporation of information based 
upon questionable criteria. A behavioral example of this phenomenon is the endorsement 
of political conspiracy theories. In agreement with the tenants of social identity processes, 
conspiracy theories denigrate opposing groups and/or powerful people, and serve as a 
reference with which to compare one’s own. Conspiracy theories are alluring because, 
even though unfounded, they serve to clarify confusing events, reframe complex and 
ambiguous events, and create a greater sense of control, thereby reducing anxiety related 
to uncertainty (Miller, Saunders, & Farhart, 2015). But certainly, rationality must 
contribute to the decision-making process as well. After all, many people pride 
themselves on being informed citizens who are not easily fooled into believing untruths. 
In order to unpack the ways in which reasoning is motivated by emotion, this discussion 
turns to the intersection of emotion and cognition.  
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Motivated Reasoning: Emotion + Cognition 
 For most, the conscious experience of decision-making seems deliberative, 
explicit, and unfettered by emotional arousal. Yet, below the threshold of awareness, the 
activation of underlying emotion influences thinking in ways that most people may not 
realize. In fact, contrary to the idea that people use logical thinking to make decisions, 
current research argues that emotional pretense motivates all reasoning (Taber & Lodge, 
2006). A priori emotions guide the perception of an event as it is compared with existing 
beliefs. Often, when an individual’s existing worldview is challenged by incongruent or 
opposing information, the new information is not easily integrated. Similarly, to social 
identity, proponents of motivated reasoning hold that new information, whether 
supportive or opposing, serves to deepen the current belief structure. Information that 
challenges one’s worldview has an unexpected bolstering effect on existing belief. This is 
because people more easily accept supporting evidence and quickly dismiss evidence that 
challenges prior beliefs and attitudes, regardless of the strength of the argument (Taber & 
Lodge, 2006). In other words, emotions often guide the thinking employed to support 
existing personal belief structures. However, research by MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, and 
Marcus (2010) demonstrates the type of emotion one experiences may lead to differing 
outcomes. For example, aversion leads to a deepened ideological stance, while anxiety 
may actually facilitate a sort of cognitive pause for thought. While a full discussion on 
the complexity of human emotion is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to 
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review some of the research from political psychology concerning the predominant 
emotions that contribute to information seeking behavior, and thus, partisanship.  
Political Emotions: Aversion, Uncertainty and Information Seeking Behavior 
 Humans are equipped with emotion and cognition that guide behavior in order to 
navigate complex social environments. The type of emotion experienced in everyday life 
is generally context specific, influences one’s perception of current events, and guides 
information seeking behavior.  Traditionally, the public glean daily updates on current 
events through mass media. News outlets were assumed to provide reliable and accurate 
information. But now, in the age of ubiquitous computing the nightly newscast or 
morning newspapers are increasingly overshadowed by a plethora of online, unchecked, 
and instantaneous feeds (Pentina & Tarafdar, 2014). Social media and Internet browsers 
are geared to maximize industry profits and gain competitive advantage by exploiting 
massive amounts of user data (Provost and Fawcett, 2013). This sets the worldwide stage 
for rapid proliferation of any sort of information. When entertainment and current events 
comingle in presentation, people may be primed to readily accept half-baked stories as 
factual. Some of these seem harmless enough, but others may become the foundation for 
conspiracy theories.  
 When emotion and politics are concerned, two types of negative emotions, 
aversion and anxiety, seem to produce different types of information seeking and related 
political behavior.  MacKuen, et al. (2010) found that aversion contributes to stronger 
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partisanship, while anxiety tends to suspend motivated reasoning in favor of a more 
deliberative type of thinking.  
 Aversion. The emotional reaction to a known threat is distinguished as aversion 
(i.e. anger, disgust, contempt, and hatred). The cognitive strategy to deal with the 
threatening situation relies upon related experience stored in memory, which then, 
depending upon habit, dictates aggression toward or distancing away from the threat. In a 
political environment, an aversive emotional response signals threat, which directs 
attention to information that supports existing views, while directing attention away from 
information that challenges these views. As the strength of partisanship increases, which 
includes the prior commitments one has made to a particular cause, aversion to opposing 
views also increases. 
 Anxiety. Conversely, anxiety, which signals risk (an unknown threat), is 
accompanied by feelings of uncertainty and temporarily suspends current beliefs as 
insufficient until efforts can be made to find the correct or safest course of action. For 
example, surveying from a broader environment, including challenging sources; one has 
a greater chance of locating an appropriate response. Gathering information from new 
sources to cope with a novel situation is an innate human strategy that promotes survival 
(van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013). In unfamiliar and uncertain situations, an anxious 
emotional response evokes cognitive strategies aimed at information seeking in the effort 
to identify and appropriately respond to the risk. The search for information creates a sort 
of cognitive pause before action, as the best strategy to deal with the threat is yet unclear.  
 In either case, when one experiences aversion or uncertainty, reasoning becomes 
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motivated toward reducing vulnerability and thus, self-protective strategies may reinforce 
or, on the other hand, expand the existing worldview. This study seeks to understand how 
partisanship influences belief in conspiracy theories, particularly for Independents. 
Therefore, it is important to understand how the socio-political environment contributes 
to group membership and the resultant political decision-making processes of the 
American voter.  
The Independent Identity 
 In 1960, Campbell, et al. described political identity as being fairly stable over an 
individual’s lifetime, and asserted Independents behaved like partisans and subsequently, 
were not really interesting as a separate group. However, as previously stated, social 
identity, which includes partisanship, is fluid and dynamic (Brewer, 2001). This is 
reflected in the 2015 poll conducted by Jones indicated 43% of Americans claim to be 
Independent, up from 36% in 1988. However, what being Independent actually means is 
varied. Keith (1992) loosely defined Independents in terms of two separate groups: (1) 
non-partisan leaning, and partisan leaning (i.e. Republican-leaning, Democrat-leaning). 
This view is also reflected in recent research that indicates some Independents are 
ideologically spread across the political spectrum and may be therefore classified as non-
leaning (i.e., “My views don’t fit one party”). While others may be very one-sided in 
their judgments, yet for social reasons, be reluctant to be labeled as such, and may 
therefore be described as partisan leaning (i.e., “I’m really a Republican, but I don’t want 
anyone to know”). Curiously, these partisan leaning Independents may also share the 
explicit desire for bipartisan compromise, but secretly (implicitly) want to fight for their 
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particular issue (Klar & Krupnikov, 2016). This study intends to further investigate these 
phenomena to better understand the effects of partisanship on political conspiracy 
endorsement, which may be useful to future endeavors pertaining to voter behavior.  
 As evidenced in the recent elections of 2016, many people believed partisanship 
to be rife with negative traits and voiced a distaste for being labeled and feeling forced to 
choose between the two political parties with which they did not whole-heatedly agree 
(MacKuen, et al., 2010). As social identity theories suggest, personal identity is coupled 
with one’s social environment, therefore, identifying as an Independent may offer 
psychological and social benefits not available in the established partisan group 
membership. Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson (2010) suggest that when overwhelmed 
by contrary information (i.e. the rise in negative campaigning strategies) (Mattes & 
Redlawsk, 2015) to the point that internal anxiety about maintaining one’s current view is 
too much; the new information must be integrated into existing beliefs. In this case, an 
individual may be less motivated to maintain their existing belief structure (Redlawsk, et 
al., 2010). Furthermore, when one does not feel the ideas and values of group 
membership are represented in existing group policy and behavior, the conflict results in 
membership abandonment (Brewer, 1991). 
 As growing intolerance toward dissimilar attitudes, values and ideas represented 
by the available political elites reached a tipping point, voters looked for another group to 
join. The Independent label is not officially recognized as an organized political party, 
and for this reason, is less defined and therefore more tolerant about membership 
ambiguity. People choose to be Independent because the category is perceived to be 
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associated with more positive, superior traits (i.e. more rational, impartial) than that of 
the partisan label.  
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Chapter 3 
THE PRESENT STUDY  
Research Questions  
 Intentionally leaving out independent partisans, research on motivated reasoning 
and political decision-making traditionally considers only conservative or liberal 
partisans. Perhaps this is related to what some believe about Independents; they are really 
partisans in hiding and not truly different (Campbell et al., 1960; Keith, 1992). However, 
as the political center widens for those who appear to be ambivalent, these partisans who 
are ‘in the middle’ or who identify as ‘independent’ present an important subgroup to 
investigate. Because choosing the Independent identity avoids the negative association 
with partisan labels, Independents would seem to be explicitly less susceptible to endorse 
conspiracy theories, when compared to partisans. However, are they truly neutral, 
employing less emotionally influenced rationality, as they would prefer to be seen? Or, 
are they implicitly just as susceptible to conspiracy theory endorsement as partisans? In 
other words, while Independents explicitly distance themselves from partisanship, do 
they implicitly endorse ideology from either conservative or liberal camps? In contrast, 
could Independents behave similarly to strong partisans who stand on one side of the 
fence? Yet still, perhaps Independents are not necessarily more biased as such, but rather 
are biased in a manner that does not reflect the stereotypical, strict adherence to any 
specific party. Employing mouse tracking methodology, this study sought to answer the 
following research questions: (1) Are Independents different than partisans and if so, in 
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what way? (2) Do all Independents respond in a similar manner when responding to 
political conspiracy theories? 
Testing Hypotheses via Response Competition and Trial Types 
 This study uses an experimental approach to evaluate the appeal of political 
conspiracy theories by measuring the response process, as recorded by computer mouse 
movement and included three trial types. In each trial, participants view a statement, 
which they must decide is true or false. Figure 1 illustrates each trial and statement type 
with an example of the target and competitor response options.  
Trial Type Control   Baseline  Party-Aligned 
Statement 
Type 
General political 
knowledge statements 
General conspiratorial 
statements 
Politically directed 
conspiracy statements 
(right-wing, left-wing 
aligned) 
Statement 
Example  
There are two years in 
one full term of office 
for U.S. Senators. 
Area 51 in Nevada is a 
secretive military base 
that contains hidden 
alien spacecraft and/or 
alien bodies.  
Barack Obama was 
born in Kenya. 
Target 
Response 
FALSE FALSE FALSE 
Competitor 
Response 
TRUE TRUE TRUE 
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Figure 1. Trial, Statement, and Response Types. Three statement types are designed to 
measure response competition. In each trial, participants select either the target response 
‘FALSE’, or the competitor response ‘TRUE.’ 
The degree to which mouse movement deviates toward the opposite response then what 
was ultimately chosen, is understood to reflect the strength that this option ‘competes’ 
with the final answer. It is this competition between the explicit response and the implicit 
process involved in decision that is understood to represent underlying bias (Duran, 
Nicholson, & Dale, manuscript in preparation).  
Hypotheses 
 We focus here on participants who identified as Independents: Non-leaning, 
Republican-leaning, and Democrat-leaning. By “leaning” Independents, we mean those 
who, when asked about their political affiliation, initially reported to be Independent, but 
when prompted in a follow-up question whether they tended to lean towards a political 
party, reported either Republican or Democrat. We also focus on only those responses 
where participants explicitly rejected the truthfulness of political conspiracy theories. 
Accordingly, the following hypotheses are proposed, with the desire to sift through the 
curious identity and corresponding behavior of the Independent voter.  
H1: Together, these hypotheses predict that non-leaning Independents, who claim to be 
genuinely untethered to either party, will actually show ideological alignment with 
various aspects of both parties. Thus, they seem to be ideologically spread across the 
conservative-liberal spectrum. Relative to Partisan-leaning Independents, both right-wing 
and left-wing aligned political conspiracies will hold implicit appeal. For non-leaning 
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Independents, while ultimately rejecting right-wing or left-wing political conspiratorial 
statements, I hypothesize: 
H1-A: Right-wing and left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold 
similar appeal when compared to each other (non-significant difference). 
H1-B: Right-wing and left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold greater 
appeal when compared to general conspiratorial (baseline) statements. 
H1-C: Right-wing and left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold greater 
appeal when compared to general knowledge (control) statements. 
H1-D: Right-wing and left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold less 
appeal when compared to all Independent ‘leaners,’ (Democrat-leaners and Republican-
leaners).  
Figure 2 contains a summary table of the expected findings and H-1 hypotheses. 
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Non-leaning Independents 
H1 - A 
Trial Type Control Baseline Right-Wing Left-Wing 
Statement 
Type 
General 
political 
information 
statements 
General 
conspiratorial 
statements 
Political 
conspiratorial 
statements 
against Obama 
Political 
conspiratorial 
statements 
against Bush 
Expected 
Behavior 
(response 
competition) 
  
≈  
to left-wing 
≈  
to right-wing 
H1- B 
Statement 
Type 
General 
political 
knowledge 
statements 
General 
conspiratorial 
statements 
Political 
conspiratorial 
statements 
against Obama 
Political 
conspiratorial 
statements 
against Bush 
Expected 
Behavior 
(response 
competition) 
 - + + 
H1 - C 
Statement 
Type 
General 
political 
knowledge 
statements 
General 
conspiratorial 
statements 
Political 
conspiratorial 
statements 
against Obama 
Political 
conspiratorial 
statements 
against Bush 
Expected 
Behavior 
(response 
competition) 
-  + + 
H1 - D 
Statement 
Type 
General 
political 
knowledge 
statements 
General 
conspiratorial 
statements 
Political 
conspiratorial 
statements 
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Figure 2. Summary Table of Expected Findings and H-1 Hypotheses. In each 
trial/statement type, + symbols represent increased values, – symbols represent 
decreased values, and ≈ symbols represent non-significant difference between statement 
types. 
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H2: These hypotheses predict that Democrat-leaning Independents will be very partisan 
in their judgments, despite their lack of an explicit Democratic group identity. Democrat-
leaning Independents will respond less like non-leaning Independents and more like 
Democrats.  Specifically, Democrat-leaning Independents will demonstrate equally 
biased response behavior similar to Democrats for right and left-wing aligned political 
conspiracy theories relative to general knowledge and general conspiracy theory items. 
For Democrat-leaning Independents, while ultimately rejecting right-wing or left-wing 
political conspiratorial statements, compared to non-leaning Independents: 
H2-A: Left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold a greater appeal when 
compared to general conspiratorial (baseline) statements. 
H2-B: Right-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold a less appeal when 
compared to general conspiratorial (baseline) statements. 
H2-C: Left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold greater appeal when 
compared to general political knowledge (control) statements. 
H2-D: Right-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold less appeal when 
compared to general political knowledge (control) statements. 
H2-E: Left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold greater appeal when 
compared to right-wing political conspiratorial statements. 
Figure 3 contains a summary table of the expected findings and H-2 hypotheses. 
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Figure 3. Summary Table of Expected Findings and H-2 Hypotheses. In each 
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decreased values, and ≈ symbols represent non-significant difference between statement 
types. 
H3: These hypotheses predict that Republican-leaning Independents will be very partisan 
in their judgments, despite their lack of an explicit Republican group identity. 
Republican-leaning Independents will respond less like Non-leaning Independents and 
more like Republicans. Specifically, Republican-leaning Independents will demonstrate 
equally biased response behavior similar to Republican for right and left-wing aligned 
political conspiracy theories relative to general knowledge and general conspiracy theory 
items. 
For Republican-leaning Independents, while ultimately rejecting right-wing or left-wing 
political conspiratorial statements, compared to non-leaning Independents: 
H3-A: Right-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold a greater appeal when 
compared to general conspiratorial (baseline) statements. 
H3-B: Left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold a less appeal when 
compared to general conspiratorial (baseline) statements. 
H3-C: Right-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold greater appeal when 
compared to general political knowledge (control) statements. 
H3-D: Left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold less appeal when 
compared to general political knowledge (control) statements. 
H3-E: Right-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold greater appeal when 
compared to left-wing political conspiratorial statements. 
Figure 4 contains a summary table of the expected findings and H-3 hypotheses. 
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Figure 4. Summary Table of Expected Findings and H-3 Hypotheses. In each 
trial/statement type, + symbols represent increased values, – symbols represent 
Republican-leaning Independents 
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decreased values, and ≈ symbols represent non-significant difference between statement 
types. 
In the attempt to understand how partisanship influences attitudes and reasoning 
when it comes to endorsing political conspiracy theories, analyzing the implicit processes 
that occur over time during decision-making is the focus of this study. The next section 
presents a general overview of the theoretical background of action dynamics 
methodology, which is necessary to understand how the notion of a greater or lesser 
appeal to political conspiracy theory endorsement is measured and quantified. This will 
be followed by an in-depth discussion of this study’s methods, followed by the results. 
 
 
 
 
   25 
Chapter 4 
METHOD 
Mouse-Tracking: Exploring Mental Activity in Body Movement 
Computer mouse tracking is a technique that captures the temporal dynamics of 
conscious processing, such as occurs during deliberation, as well as the hidden, automatic 
processes that influence decision-making. These data can be used to describe the strength 
of hidden (implicit) bias, not otherwise captured with traditional survey methods. 
Therefore, in pursuit of a dynamic view of cognition, mouse-tracking methods record 
mental activity as it is expressed in body movement (Dale, Kehoe, & Spivey, 2007) . The 
motion trajectories of the mouse are believed to reflect the multiple, parallel cognitive 
processes that ultimately converge into a final, integrated response (Hehman, Stolier, & 
Freeman, 2014; Wojnowicz, Ferguson, Dale, & Spivey, 2009). In this way, it is possible 
to observe the mental activity of political decision-making and analyze the competition 
between explicit and implicit responding through survey participants’ arm motor 
movements as they respond to a series of politically related statements (Duran, 
Nicholson, & Dale, 2015). Mouse tracking provides real-time processing of the temporal 
dynamics in the survey data, beginning with participant activation and continuing through 
each trial to response. Capturing this entire event provides a window into the dynamic 
and complex events of decision-making. 
Study Design 
 Duran, Nicholson, and Dale (manuscript in preparation) were the principal 
investigators in the primary study, from which the focus of this study is drawn. Their 
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work highlighted the response attraction and resistance to political conspiracy theories for 
Republican and Democrat partisans. This study investigates Independents as a distinct 
group from that of traditional partisans in Duran et al. (manuscript in preparation). To do 
so, three sub-types of Independent political identity were extracted from the primary data. 
These groups represent the hypothesized types of Independent voter (1) non-leaning 
Independents, (2) Republican-leaning Independents, and (3) Democrat-leaning 
Independents.  
 The mouse-tracking methodology captures the response process as participants 
either endorsed (responded ‘True’) or rejected (responded ‘False’) statements related to 
1) general political knowledge, 2) general conspiracy theories, 3) Republican, party-
aligned (right-wing) conspiracy theories (against Barack Obama), and 4) Democrat, 
party-aligned (left-wing) conspiracy theories (against George W. Bush).   
 Stimuli Statements. The general political knowledge stimuli included statements 
about general political information (i.e. “There are two years in one full term of office for 
U.S. Senators.”), and general knowledge statements about Barack Obama and George W. 
Bush (i.e. “Barack Obama has two sons.” and “George W. Bush is married to Michelle 
Bush.”). The general conspiratorial stimuli included statements about general conspiracy 
theories (i.e. “Area 51 in Nevada is a secretive military base that contains hidden alien 
spacecraft and/or alien bodies.”). The party-aligned political conspiracy theory stimuli 
included statements about Barack Obama and George Bush (i.e. right-wing: “Barack 
Obama was born in Kenya.” and left-wing “George W. Bush knew that 9/11 was going to 
happen.”). See Appendix D for the complete list of stimuli statements used in this study.  
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 Mouse Tracking: Movement Trajectories and Critical Measures. In this 
study, from the onset of movement through final response selection, mouse tracking 
recorded the continuous movement of the computer mouse as participants responded to 
true/false survey questions. As previously described, this movement, or trajectory, 
illustrates the corresponding mental and motor processes involved in response selection 
(Freeman, Dale, & Farmer, 2011). To demonstrate this methodology, an example of a 
trial in this study is appropriate. In each trial, following presentation of the stimuli 
statement, the participant responds by moving the mouse toward one of the two target 
words (i.e. ‘True’ is located on the left side of the screen, ‘False’ is located on the right 
side of the screen). From each trial, two important mouse-tracking measurements are 
captured. These are (1) the initial time it takes for each participant to move the mouse, 
and (2) the mouse movement toward a response option. In action dynamic terms, the time 
recorded in the initial mouse movement is (1) latency of response initiation (latency) and 
(2) the non-linear movement around the screen prior to the clicked response is measured 
and averaged as deviation toward competitor (average deviation).  
Procedure 
 The survey ran from January 2014 to October 2014 and consisted of 38 true-false 
statements (general political knowledge, general conspiracy theories, left-wing aligned 
political conspiracy theories, and right-wing aligned political conspiracy theories). After 
each statement, participants rated their level of confidence in rejecting or endorsing the 
item. Following the true-false portion, participants explicitly identified political party 
affiliation by responding to standard questions (AEI, 2013; Miller et al., 2015) and 
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provided demographic information. Participants were compensated $1.50 for 
participation.  
 Each statement was presented two words at a time. Participants clicked to 
advance until the statement was completed on the final screen. Participants then had 6 
seconds to respond (either true or false) or the trial was skipped and participants were 
warned they would not receive payment if they continued to delay their responses. The 
True/False response locations were counterbalanced during responding. Figure 5 provides 
a visualization of the computer screen progression in a mouse-tracking trial.  
 
Figure 5. Visualization of the Computer Screen in a Mouse-Tracking Trial. Participants 
click to advance through stimuli statement, presented 2 words at a time to the response 
screen. The black dot (center bottom – origin point) represents the mouse starting 
position. The dotted blue line represents the ideal mouse trajectory toward the response 
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location (target – ‘False’). The red dotted lines represent possible trajectories deviating 
toward the competitor response location (competitor – ‘True’). Adapted from 
“Simultaneous Attraction and Resistance to Political Conspiracies in a Real-Time 
Decision-Tracking Task,” by N. D. Duran, S. P. Nicholson, and R. Dale, 2017, 
Manuscript in preparation.  
Participants 
 To draw participants from a global network, participants were recruited using 
Amazon mTurk, an online crowdsourcing platform, which requires users to have an 
established account and meet the qualifications for the survey, including an informed 
consent. This research was conducted with the approval of the Institutional Review Board 
at Arizona State University. Prior to beginning the survey, participants were informed 
that proceeding to the next screen indicated consent. Prior to analyzing the data, 
participant personal identity information was removed. 
 In total, (after removing participants who did not complete the survey, those who 
were left-handed, those who violated the time constraint to answer each survey question, 
individuals who attempted to complete the survey more than once, and those who lived 
outside of the U.S.) data from 852 participants were recorded with the mean age of 35.19 
years. There were 335 females.  Participants self-identified as Democrat, Republican, or 
Independent. Those who self-identified as Independent were further parsed according to 
their explicitly stated tendency to endorse ideology considered to be 1) more liberal 
(Democrat), 2) more conservative ideology (Republican) or 3) neither. These participants 
were then categorized as 1) Democrat-leaning Independent, 2), Republican-leaning 
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Independent or 3) Non-leaning Independent, respectively. Of the total 852 participants, 
Democrat responders (mean age 33.76 years) accounted for 59.22% (504 participants), 
and Republican responders (mean age 36.63 years) totaled 22.68% (193). Of the 358 
participants who identified as Independent, 154 (18.08%) self-identified as Non-leaning 
Independents, 130 (15.26%) as Democrat-leaning Independents, and 74 (8.68%) as 
Republican-leaning Independents. 
Analysis Approach and Data Preparation  
 To reduce management complexity and consequent analysis, only the data related 
to the three Independent sub-groups were retained. Much of the robust data collected 
during the primary study phase were removed, as they were extraneous and unrelated to 
the main topic of this study. (See Duran, Nicholson & Dale, manuscript in preparation). 
The data preparation included the following steps. (1) Participants who identified as 
Republican or Democrat were removed. (2) The stimuli correctly answered as ‘true,’ and 
those indirect and positively valenced statements were not included in this study. (3) 
Additionally, trials where participants endorsed conspiracy theories (“believers”) were 
removed. (4) Finally, statements originally classified as “high” or “low” knowledge were 
collapsed into a general political knowledge category. For analysis, the locations of 
individual responses (procedurally counterbalanced) were transformed so that the target 
response (false – reject) would always be in the top-right corner (positive coordinate 
region) and the competitor response (true – endorse) would always be in the top-left 
corner (negative coordinate region).  
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 Coded predictors and planned contrasts. The two dependent variables were 
modeled as a function of the deviation coded predictors: Non-leaning Independents = 0.5, 
Republican-leaning Independents -0.5; Non-leaning Independents = 0.5, Democrat-
leaning Independents -0.5; Non-leaning Independents = 0.5, All-leaning Independents -
0.5. In addition, the planned contrasts (i.e. Non-leaning Independents relative to 
Republican-leaning Independents) for right-wing and left-wing political conspiratorial 
statements were contrasted with control and baseline statements: right-wing compared to 
general political knowledge (0.5, -0.5); left-wing compared to general political 
knowledge (0.5, -0.5); right-wing compared to left-wing (0.5, -0.5); right-wing compared 
to general political conspiracy (0.5, -0.5); left-wing compared to general political 
conspiracy (0.5, -0.5). 
Variables Defined 
 There are two independent variables and two dependent variables in this study. 
The first independent variable, political identity, contains the three sub-types of 
Independent political identity: (1) non-leaning Independents, (2) Republican-leaning 
Independents, and (3) Democrat-leaning Independents, which were extracted from the 
primary data and represent the hypothesized types of Independent voter. The second 
independent variable, response type, contains the four stimuli statement types described 
above: (1) general political knowledge, (2) general conspiracy theories, (3) left-wing 
aligned political conspiracies, and (4) right-wing aligned political conspiracies. The two 
dependent variables represent the mouse-tracking measures mentioned above: (1) latency 
of response initiation (latency) and (2) deviation toward competitor (average deviation) 
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(Spivey & Dale, 2004). The following provides additional context for how each category 
and variable were defined. 
 Independent Variables. 
 Political identity. (1) Non-leaning Independent: participants who explicitly 
reported not identifying with more liberal or more conservative ideology (2) Democrat-
leaning Independent: participants who explicitly reported to endorse a more liberal 
political ideology, (3) Republican-leaning Independent: participants who explicitly 
reported to endorse a more conservative political ideology. 
 Response type. (1) General political knowledge (2) General conspiracy theories 
(3) Left-wing aligned political conspiracies and (4) Right-wing aligned political 
conspiracies. 
 Dependent Variables. Two dynamic measures along an X and Y-axis were 
generated. These include (1) latency of response initiation, and (2) average deviation 
toward the competing response option.  
 Latency of Response Initiation (Latency): The time it takes to move 100 pixels 
from the point of origin to the response location within each trial. Initially, an increase in 
latency time suggests a hesitation to commit to the target response due to the competition 
of the alternative response (i.e. the competitor is a reasonable choice). See Figure 5. 
  Deviation toward Competitor (Average Deviation). The deviation of the mouse 
trajectory at each coordinate position, computed from a hypothetical straight line drawn 
from the origin point to the target response. The degree of deviation is assumed to be an 
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index of response competition strength. The average deviation indicates the implicit bias 
to endorse the option not explicitly selected. See Figure 5. 
Statistical Model 
 In order to analyze between group differences in the three subtypes of 
Independent identity, and in the same manner as was conducted in the primary study by 
Duran, et al., (manuscript in preparation), a linear mixed-effect model analysis was 
conducted using R version 3.3.1 and the lme4 package version 1.1-7 (Bates, Maechler, & 
Bolker, 2011). Duran, et al., (manuscript in preparation), provide complete details, 
including the code and specification of planned contrasts, for the R Markdown tutorial. 
 Analysis justification. This study design included two independent variables 
(political identity, response type) and two dependent variables (latency and average 
deviation). Linear mixed-effects models are designed to handle data when observations 
are not independent, such as the clustered data in this study (Woltman, Feldstain, 
MacKay, & Rocchi, 2012). This method of analysis is appropriate to use in a repeated 
measures study when the assumption of independent of observations is violated (e.g. data 
entered in nested format, person-period vs. person-level) with a separate line for each 
observation for each subject. In a repeated measures study, these data are collected at 
different times under different conditions and are nested within each study participant 
(Woltman, Feldstain, MacKay, & Rocchi, 2012).  
 This model uses variables at levels to adjust the regression of the base-level 
dependent variables on the base-level independent variables. Multilevel, in this case, is 
better at revealing the difference in variance among the units of analysis in different 
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groups comprising each level. This results in an improved estimate of the individual and 
cross-level effects (Mickelson, 2016). Furthermore, the traditional approach that relies 
upon aggregation is inappropriate for this analysis because in each “super level,” each 
question/response is averaged (e.g. general knowledge, general conspiracy, right-wing 
and left-wing conspiracy). This creates problems because the fewer units of analysis 
replace the many units at the base level, resulting in a loss of statistical power. Ecological 
fallacy then becomes a concern because the necessary correspondence between 
individual-level and group-level variable relationships does not exist (e.g. political 
identity correlates little with each stimulus question/response, but correlates well at 
averaged response type). A linear mixed-effect analysis includes the fixed effects of 
predictors, and random effects (intercepts) for each subject and item, thus characterizing 
the idiosyncratic variations due to individual differences (Winter, 2012).  
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Chapter 5 
RESULTS 
Analysis  
 Separate linear mixed-effect analyses produced the fixed effects of predictors and 
random effects (intercepts) for each subject and item on average deviation and latency. 
Interactions were probed with planned contrasts between statement types (i.e. right-wing 
vs. left-wing, right-wing vs. general political knowledge). The following results include 
the coefficients of each predictor, standard error, p-value (approximated from the t-value 
for each factor in the model), as well as the captured variance of the overall model 
reported as Conditional R2 (R2), which represents the variance that is explained by the 
fixed and random factors together. See Duran, et al., (manuscript in preparation), for the 
MuMIn R statistical package, version 1.15.6, used to compute R2.    
H1 Hypothesis and Results. Non-leaning Independents, while ultimately rejecting right-
wing or left-wing political conspiratorial statements:  
H1-A: Political conspiratorial statements will hold similar appeal when compared to 
each other.  
Non-leaners demonstrated a non-significant difference between right-wing and left-
wing political conspiratorial statements on each index of response competition (average 
deviation) b = 1.66, SE = 9.69, t(0.17), p < 0.86, R2 = 0.11; and (latency) b = 24.73, SE = 
46.86, t(0.52), p < 0.59, R2 = 0.31.  In other words, non-leaners were not more attracted 
to endorsing either type of political conspiracy theory.  
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H1-B: Right-wing and left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold greater 
appeal when compared to general conspiratorial (baseline) statements. Non-leaning 
Independents demonstrated a significant difference between right-wing political 
conspiratorial statements and general political conspiratorial statements on average 
deviation, b = 28.19, SE = 10.92, t(2.58), p < 0.10, R2 = 0.11, but not latency b = 17.87, 
SE = 54.32, t(0.32), p < 0.74, R2 = 0.31. Non-leaning Independents demonstrated a 
significant difference between left-wing political conspiratorial statements and general 
political conspiratorial statements on average deviation b = 26.53, SE = 10.85, t(2.44), p 
< 0.01, R2 = 0.11, but not latency b = -6.85, SE = 54.11, t(-0.12), p < 0.89, R2 = 0.31. In 
other words, on average, before ultimately rejecting (response: ‘False’), non-leaning 
Independents deviated more toward accepting (response: ‘True’) the party-aligned 
political conspiratorial statements than the general conspiratorial statements, but the time 
spent to do so was not different between the statement types.  
H1-C: Right-wing and left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold greater 
appeal when compared to general knowledge (control) statements.  
Non-leaning Independents demonstrated a marginally significant difference between 
right-wing political conspiratorial statements and general political knowledge statements 
on average deviation, b = 11.05, SE = 5.91, t(1.86), p < 0.06, R2 = 0.11, but not latency b 
= 18.73, SE = 28.77, t(0.65), p < 0.51, R2 = 0.31. In other words, on average, before 
ultimately rejecting (response: ‘False’), non-leaning Independents marginally deviated 
more toward accepting (response: ‘True’) the right-wing political conspiratorial 
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statements than the general political knowledge statements, but the time spent to do so 
was not different between the statement types.  
Non-leaning Independents demonstrated a non-significant difference between left-
wing political conspiratorial statements and general political knowledge statements on 
average deviation, b = 9.39, SE = 5.85, t(1.60), p < 0.10, R2 = 0.11, as well as latency, b = 
-5.99, SE = 28.58, t(-0.20), p < 0.83, R2 = 0.31. 
H1-D: Right-wing and left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold less appeal 
when compared to all Independent ‘leaners.’  
 When compared to all Republican-leaning and Democrat-leaning Independents, 
non-leaning Independents demonstrated two significant differences on average deviation 
only: (1) a greater competition towards endorsement of left-wing political conspiratorial 
statements as compared to general knowledge items b = -9.54, SE = 4.52, t(-2.10), p < 
0.03, R2 = 0.11, (non-significant latency b = 3.86, SE = 20.83, t(0.18), p < 0.85, R2 = 0.33) 
and (2) a greater competition towards endorsement of left-wing political conspiratorial 
statements as compared to general conspiratorial statements b = -17.42, SE = 7.65, t(-
2.27), p < 0.02, R2 = 0.11, (non-significant latency b = 8.04, SE = 35.22, t(0.22), p < 0.81, 
R2 = 0.33). 
All other comparisons were non-significant on average deviation and latency as 
follows: (1) Right-wing political conspiratorial statements to General political knowledge 
statements, average deviation b = -2.83, SE = 4.60, t(-0.61), p < 0.53, R2 = 0.11 and, 
latency b = 25.17, SE = 21.20, t(1.18), p < 0.23, R2 = 0.33 (2) Right-wing political 
conspiratorial statements to General conspiratorial statements, average deviation b = -
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10.71 , SE = 7.75, t(-1.38), p < 0.16, R2 = 0.11, and latency b = 29.36, SE = 35.67, t(0.82), 
p < 0.41, R2 = 0.33 (3) Right-wing political conspiratorial statements to Left-wing 
political conspiratorial statements, average deviation b = 6.71, SE = 7.71, t(0.86), p < 
0.38, R2 = 0.11, and latency b = 21.31, SE = 35.50, t(0.60), p < 0.54, R2 = 0.33. 
H2 Hypothesis and Results. For Democrat-leaning Independents, while ultimately 
rejecting right-wing or left-wing political conspiratorial statements, compared to non-
leaning Independents: 
H2-A: Left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold a greater appeal when 
compared to general conspiratorial (baseline) statements.  
Democrat-leaning Independents demonstrated a non-significant difference on average 
deviation b = -1.74, SE = 10.62, t(-0.16), p < 0.86, R2 = 0.33, or on latency b = 50.05, SE 
= 48.89, t(1.02), p < 0.30 R2 = 0.33. In other words, on average Democrat-leaning 
Independents did not deviate significantly towards endorsement of left-wing political 
conspiratorial statements compared to general conspiratorial (baseline) statements, nor 
did they differ in the time to initiate mouse movement.  
H2-B: Right-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold a less appeal when 
compared to general conspiratorial (baseline) statements.  
 Democrat-leaning Independents demonstrated a significant difference on average 
deviation b = -22.57, SE = 10.49, t(-2.15), p < 0.03, R2 = 0.33, but not on latency b = 
13.32, SE = 48.30, t(0.27), p < 0.30, R2 = 0.33. In other words, on average Democrat-
leaning Independents show less competition towards endorsement of right-wing political 
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conspiratorial statements as compared to general conspiratorial statements, but they did 
not differ in the time to initiate mouse movement. 
H2-C: Left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold greater appeal when 
compared to general political knowledge (control) statements.  
Democrat-leaning Independents demonstrated a non-significant difference on average 
deviation b = 4.98, SE = 6.27, t(0.79), p < 0.42, R2 = 0.33, and latency b = 32.30, SE = 
28.86, t(1.11), p < 0.26, R2 = 0.33. In other words, on average Democrat-leaning 
Independents did not deviate significantly towards endorsement of left-wing political 
conspiratorial statements compared to general political knowledge (control) statements, 
nor did they differ in the time to initiate mouse movement. 
H2-D: Right-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold less appeal when 
compared to general political knowledge (control) statements.  
Democrat-leaning Independents demonstrated a significant difference on average 
deviation b = -15.84, SE = 6.15, t(-2.57.), p < 0.01, R2 = 0.33, but not latency b = - 4.42, 
SE = 28.34, t(-0.15), p < 0.87, R2 = 0.33. In other words, Democrat-leaning Independents 
show less competition towards endorsement of right-wing political conspiratorial 
statements as compared to general political knowledge statements, but they did not differ 
in the time to initiate mouse movement. 
H2-E: Left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold greater appeal when 
compared to right-wing political conspiratorial statements. 
Democrat-leaning Independents demonstrated a significant difference on average 
deviation b = -20.83, SE = 10.47, t(-1.98), p < 0.04, R2 = 0.33, but not on latency b = -
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36.72, SE = 48.17, t(-0.76), p < 0.44, R2 = 0.33. In other words, Democrat-leaning 
Independents show less competition towards endorsement of right-wing political 
conspiratorial statements as compared to left-wing items, but they did not differ in the 
time to initiate mouse movement. 
H3 Hypothesis and Results. For Republican-leaning Independents, while ultimately 
rejecting right-wing or left-wing political conspiratorial statements, compared to non-
leaning Independents: 
H3-A: Right-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold a greater appeal when 
compared to general conspiratorial (baseline) statements.  
Republican-leaning Independents demonstrated a significant difference on average 
deviation b = 13.15, SE = 12.49, t(1.05), p < 0.29, R2 = 0.11, but not on latency b = 30.41, 
SE = 57.50, t(0.52), p < 0.59, R2 = 0.33. In others words, on average Republican-leaning 
Independents deviated more towards endorsement (response: ‘True’) of right-wing 
political conspiratorial statements as compared to general political knowledge statements, 
but they did not differ in the time to initiate mouse movement. 
H3-B: Left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold a less appeal when 
compared to general conspiratorial (baseline) statements.  
Republican-leaning Independents demonstrated a significant difference on average 
deviation b = -22.56, SE = 11.78, t(-1.91.), p < 0.05, R2 = 0.11, but not on latency b = -
45.22, SE = 54.21, t(-0.83), p < 0.40, R2 = 0.30. In others words, on average Republican-
leaning Independents deviated less towards endorsement of left-wing political 
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conspiratorial statements as compared to general political knowledge statements, but they 
did not differ in the time to initiate mouse movement. 
H3-C: Right-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold greater appeal when 
compared to general political knowledge (control) statements.  
Republican-leaning Independents demonstrated a marginally significant difference on 
average deviation b = 15.98, SE = 7.54, t(2.11), p < 0.03, R2 = 0.11, but not on latency b 
= 43.83, SE = 34.73, t(1.26), p < 0.20, R2 = 0.33. In others words, on average Republican-
leaning Independents deviated marginally more towards endorsement of left-wing 
political conspiratorial statements as compared to general conspiratorial statements, but 
they did not differ in the time to initiate mouse movement. 
H3-D: Left-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold less appeal when 
compared to general political knowledge (control) statements.  
Republican-leaning Independents demonstrated non-significant difference on average 
deviation b = -19.74, SE = 6.94, t(-2.84), p < 0.004, R2 = 0.11, but not on latency b = -
31.81, SE = 31.94, t (-0.99), p < 0.31, R2 = 0.33. In others words, on average Republican-
leaning Independents did not deviate significantly towards endorsement of left-wing 
political conspiratorial statements as compared to general conspiratorial statements, but 
they did not differ in the time to initiate mouse movement. 
H3-E: Right-wing political conspiratorial statements will hold greater appeal when 
compared to left-wing political conspiratorial statements. 
Republican-leaning Independents demonstrated a significant difference on average 
deviation b = 35.72, SE = 12.25, t(2.91), p < 0.003, R2 = 0.11, but not on latency b = 
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75.64, SE = 56.42, t(1.43), p < 0.18, R2 = 0.33. In other words, on average Republican-
leaning Independents deviated more towards endorsement of right-wing political 
conspiratorial statements as compared to left-wing political conspiratorial statements, but 
they did not differ in the time to initiate mouse movement. 
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Chapter 6 
DISCUSSION 
Employing a mouse-tracking method, this study sought to elucidate the three sub-
types of Independent participant as they responded to political conspiratorial statements. 
The results confirmed general expectations related to Non-leaning Independents. They 
indeed appear to behave quite differently than their partisan-leaning counterparts 
(Republican-leaning and Democrat-leaning). A summary of the findings, accompanied by 
an explanatory visualization of the average divergence over time will further elucidate 
these findings. 
Non-leaning Independents 
 Non-leaning Independents, as they ultimately rejected political conspiratorial 
statements were (1) not more attracted to endorsing either type of political conspiracy 
theory, (2) deviated more toward accepting (response: ‘True’) the party-aligned political 
conspiratorial statements than the general conspiratorial statements, and (3) deviated 
marginally more toward accepting (response: ‘True’) the right-wing political 
conspiratorial statements than the general political knowledge statements. Furthermore, 
when compared to all Independent ‘leaners,’ (Republican-leaning and Democrat-leaning) 
non-leaning Independents demonstrated two significant differences, (1) stronger 
deviation towards accepting left-wing political conspiratorial statements as compared to 
general knowledge items, and (2) stronger deviation towards accepting left-wing political 
conspiratorial statements as compared to general conspiratorial statements. Figure 6(a) 
provides a visualization of the Non-leaning Independents average divergence of party-
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aligned (right-wing, left-wing) political conspiratorial and general conspiratorial 
(baseline) statement types relative to general political knowledge (control) statements. 
It appears then, that non-leaning Independents do not favor either right-wing or left-
wing political conspiracies, necessarily, but deviate more towards accepting all party-
aligned conspiratorial statements more than general conspiratorial statements. This 
behavior perhaps reflects a context specific conspiratorial endorsement, indicative of 
environmental events that trigger feelings of vulnerability when the political ideology to 
which one ascribes is not represented by the political elites (Abalakina-Paap, et al., 
1999), and are not predictive of a worldview that is generalized by conspiracy ideation 
(Swami, 2012). In addition, non-leaning Independents when compared to all Independent 
‘leaners,’ were more attracted toward left-wing political conspiratorial statements. This 
behavior indicates that conspiracies that placed George W. Bush in a poor light were 
more attractive than all other conspiratorial statements, which suggests non-leaning 
Independents, compared to all ‘leaners’ combined, may actually hold a more liberal 
ideology. Outside of being strictly related to partisanship, however, another consideration 
to explain the behavior is that non-leaning Independents held beliefs pertaining to the 
specific individual (George W. Bush) highlighted in the conspiratorial statements that 
motivated the stronger attraction to endorse left-wing political conspiracies. Personal 
characteristics, such as perceived competence and ability, may be more salient and 
therefore more influential in decision-making (Kalish & Luria, 2016).  
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Democrat-leaning Independents vs. Non-leaning Independents 
 Democrat-leaning Independents relative to Non-leaning Independents show less 
competition towards endorsement of right-wing political conspiracy theories compared to 
left-wing, general knowledge, and general conspiracy items. Figure 6(c) provides a 
visualization of the Democrat-leaning Independents average divergence of party-aligned 
(right-wing, left-wing) political conspiratorial and general conspiratorial (baseline) 
statement types relative to general political knowledge (control) statements.  
Interestingly, the Democrat-leaning Independents in this study, while not 
behaving like the Non-Independents, did not respond in a manner similar to their 
Democrat partisan counterparts. The fluidity of social identity in relation to partisanship 
(Brewer, 2001) helps to explain this behavior. Democrat-leaning Independents, while 
holding a more liberal ideology than their non-leaning or Republican-leaning 
counterparts, may not whole-heartedly agree with the Democrat identity and feel less 
motivated to maintain group membership. Perhaps this is because they do not believe the 
ideas and values of group membership are represented in the existing group policy and 
behavior (Mattes & Redlawsk, 2015). The conflict between what they believe it means to 
be a Democrat and the perception of group political elites causes Democrat-leaners to 
seek shelter under the Independent label. Another possibility for the unexpected behavior 
is that the political conspiratorial statements were not equally salient. Finally, Miller et 
al., (2015), state that the psychological benefits that conspiracy theory endorsement 
provides are greater when the party to which one is a member is not in control. Therefore, 
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because the survey was conducted in the political environment in which a Democrat held 
the presidency, perhaps left-wing party aligned conspiracies were less alluring.  
Republican-leaning Independents vs. Non-leaning Independents 
 Republican-leaning Independents relative to Non-leaning Independents show (1) 
more competition towards endorsement of right-wing political conspiracies as compared 
to general knowledge items and left-wing items, (2) show less competition towards 
endorsement of left-wing political conspiracy theories as compared to general knowledge 
items. The competition towards endorsement of left-wing political conspiracy theories as 
compared to general conspiracy items approached significance. Republican-leaning 
Independents appear to behave in a manner expected of their Republican partisan 
counterparts, and thus akin to previous research claiming their ostensible nature. 
Therefore, Republican-leaning Independents appear to seek the perceived social benefits 
of the Independent identity (i.e. more rational, impartial) rather than truly holding 
incongruent ideology that would prevent them from identifying as Republican. Figure 
6(b) provides a visualization of the Republican-leaning Independents average divergence 
of party-aligned (right-wing, left-wing) political conspiratorial and general conspiratorial 
(baseline) statement types relative to general political knowledge (control) statements. 
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Social identity theories describe group membership as dynamic; when 
membership becomes incongruent with personal ideology, identification with that group 
no longer meets the underlying needs and motives of those who subscribe to the group, 
which can lead to movement out of that group and into another (Brewer 2001; Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, Sulloway, 2003). Social identity is an essential aspect of partisanship 
as party membership influences an individual’s interpretation of political information 
(Bolsen, et al.,2013). Self-categorization theory describes the importance of the collective 
identity that reflects group membership in the definition of self (Turner & Onorato, 
1999). Affective reactions to social groups and important issues, governed by moral 
judgment, often influence reasoning and decision-making (Brandt, et al., 2014; Haidt, 
2001; Liu & Ditto, 2012). Consequently, a research method such as mouse tracking 
provides rich cognitive data generated in response to emotionally charged stimuli.  
Gaining insight into the political decision-making process of modern-day 
Independents may help to elucidate voting behavior, improve election predictions and 
outcomes, and thereby enlighten the future landscape of American sociopolitical 
environment. The explosion of social media over the past few decades has promoted the 
rapid and broad dissemination of information, regardless of the source and without 
confirmation of credibility. The filters and settings available for social media and even 
internet browsers allows the public to effectively create what some have referred to as a 
filter bubble (Pariser, 2012); news and information that caters only to the desires of the 
user, effectively removing any opposing or unfavorable view (An, Quercia, Cha, 
Gummadi, & Crowcroft, 2014). Thus, an effort to highlight the importance of critical 
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thinking when evaluating an argument requires a degree of skepticism, in which one 
seeks information from multiple sources (Hutchens, Hmielowski, Pinkleton, & Beam, 
2016). But too much creates cynicism spurring disengagement, and ultimately inactivity 
(Desliver, 2016). However, in today’s political environment, apathy seems not an option 
because the health of a democracy requires the dedicated commitment of its citizens 
(Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen (2012).  
Study Limitations and Future Directions 
 The number of participants in two of the sub-groups (Republican-leaning and 
Democrat-leaning) was lower than the target of 150 to ensure adequate statistical power 
comparable to key mouse-tracking studies (Duran, et al., manuscript in preparation; 
McKinstry, Dale & Spivey, 2008). It is possible that the lower number of participants 
could lead to spurious results. Consequently, the proposed direction for future 
investigation would include new data collection and include the contemporary political 
conspiracy theories and candidates surrounding the 2016 presidential campaign. The 
salience of these conspiracy theories, combined with the unusual political environment 
leading up to and following the 2017 presidential inauguration may provide fruitful 
insights into the sociopolitical climate of the current two-party system.  
 
 
 
 
 
   50 
 
REFERENCES 
Abalakina-Paap, M., Stephan, W. G., Craig, T., & Gregory, W. L. (1999). Beliefs in 
Conspiracies. Political Psychology, 20(3), 637–647. https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-
895X.00160 
 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. (2013). "Public opinion on 
conspiracy theories (Survey report). http://www.aei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/-public-opinion-on-conspiracy-
theories_181649218739.pdf 
 
An, J., Quercia, D., Cha, M., Gummadi, K., & Crowcroft, J. (2014). Sharing political 
news: The balancing act of intimacy and socialization in selective exposure. EPJ 
Data Science, 3(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1140/epjds/s13688-014-0012-2 
 
Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B. (2011). Lme4: Linear mixed-effects models using s4 
classes. URL http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lme4/index.html 
 
Bolsen, T., Druckman, J. N., & Cook, F. L. (2013). The influence of partisan motivated 
reasoning on public opinion. Political Behavior, 36(2), 235-262. 
doi:10.1007/s11109-013-9238-0 
 
Bost, P. R. (2015). Crazy beliefs, sane believers: toward a cognitive psychology of 
conspiracy ideation. Skeptical Inquirer, 39(1), 44-49. 
 
Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T., & Wetherell, G. (2014). The 
ideological-conflict hypothesis: Intolerance among both liberals and 
conservatives. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(1), 27-34. 
doi:10.1177/0963721413510932 
 
Brewer, M. B. (1991). The Social Self: On being the same and different at the same time. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17(5), 475-482. 
doi:10.1177/0146167291175001 
 
Brewer, M. B. (2001). The many faces of social identity:Implications for political 
psychology. Political Psychology, 22(1), 115-125. 
doi:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791908 
 
Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). The American 
voter. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
 
   51 
Conover, P. J. (1988). The role of social groups in political thinking. British Journal of 
Political Science, 18(1), 51-76. doi:10.1017/S0007123400004956 
 
Converse, P. E. (1964/2006). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. Critical 
Review, 18(1-3), 1-74. doi:Retrieved from 
http://login.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/2
17270234?accountid=4485 
 
Dale, R., Kehoe, C., & Spivey, M. J. (2007). Graded motor responses in the time course 
of categorizing atypical exemplars. Memory and Cognition, 35(1), 15-28. 
doi:10.3758/BF03195938 
 
Desliver, D. (2016). U.S. voter turnout trails most developed countries. Retrieved 
December 29, 2016, from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/02/u-s-
voter-turnout-trails-most-developed-countries/ 
 
Denzau, A. T., & North, D. C. (1994). Shared mental models: Ideologies and institutions. 
Kyklos, 47(1), 3-31.  
 
Ditto, P. H., & Lopez, D. F. (1992). Motivated skepticism: Use of differential decision 
criteria for preferred and nonpreferred conclusions. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 63(4), 568-584. 
 
Duran, N. D., Nicholson, S., & Dale, R. (2015). Tracking the response dynamics of 
implicit partisan biases. Paper presented at the 37th Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society, Austin, TX. 
 
Duran, N. D., Nicholson, S., & Dale, R. (2017). Simultaneous Attraction and Resistance 
to Political Conspiracies in a Real-Time Decision-Tracking Task. Manuscript in 
preparation.   
 
Freeman, J. B., Dale, R., & Farmer, T. A. (2011). Hand in motion reveals mind in 
motion. Frontiers in Psychology, 2, 59. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00059 
 
Greene, S. (2004). Social identity theory and party identification. Social Science 
Quarterly, 85(1), 136-153.  
 
Groenendyk, E. W. (2013). Competing motives in the partisan mind : How loyalty and 
responsiveness shape party identification and democracy  
doi:http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=
nlebk&AN=619744&site=ehost-live 
 
   52 
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to 
moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814-834. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814 
 
Hehman, E., Stolier, R. M., & Freeman, J. B. (2014). Advanced mouse-tracking analytic 
techniques for enhancing psychological science. Group Processes & Intergroup 
Relations, 18(3), 384-401. doi:10.1177/1368430214538325 
 
Hornsey, M. J. (2008). Social identity theory and self-categorization theory: A historical 
review. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(1), 204-222. 
doi:10.111/j.1751-9004.2007.00066.x 
 
Hutchens, M. J., Hmielowski, J. D., Pinkleton, B. E., & Beam, M. A. (2016). A spiral of 
skepticism? The relationship between citizens’ involvement with campaign 
information to their skepticism and political knowledge. Journalism & Mass 
Communications Quarterly, 93(4), 1073–1090. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699016654439 
 
Jones, J. M. (2015). In U.S., new record 43% are political Independents.   Retrieved from 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/180440/new-record-political-independents.aspx 
 
Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, 
functions, and elective affinities. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 307-337. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163600 
 
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Exceptions that prove 
the rule: Using a theory of motivated social cognition to account for ideological 
incongruities and political anomalies: Reply to Greenberg and Jonas (2003). 
Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 383-393. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.383 
 
Kalish, Y., Luria, G. (2016). Leadership emergence over time in short-lived groups:  
Integrating expectations states theory with temporal person-perception and self-
serving bias. Journal  of Applied Psychology, 101(10),1474-
1486. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/apl0000126 
 
Kamieniecki, S. (1993). Review of The Myth of the Independent Voter. The Journal of 
Politics, 55(3), 817-820. 
doi:http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/stable/2132006 
 
Keith, B. E. (1992). The Myth of the Independent voter. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
 
Klar, S., & Krupnikov, Y. (2016). Independent politics: How American disdain for 
parties leads to political inaction. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
   53 
 
Lavine, H. G., Johnston, C. D., & Steenbergen, M. R. (2012). The ambivalent partisan: 
How critical loyalty promotes democracy. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
MacKuen, M., Wolak, J., Keele, L., & Marcus, G. E. (2010). Civic engagements: 
Resolute partisanship or reflective deliberation. American Journal of Political 
Science, 54(2), 440-458. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00440.x 
 
Mattes, K., & Redlawsk, D. P. (2015). Positive case for negative campaigning.  
Retrieved from http://www.myilibrary.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu?ID=691786  
 
McKinstry, C., Dale, R., & Spivey, M. J. (2008). Action dynamics reveal parallel 
competition in decision making. Psychological Science, 19, 22-24. 
 
Mickelson, K. (2016). PSY 598: Multivariate Statistics, HLM Lectures 1, 2, 3. 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling. Master of Science, Psychology program. Arizona 
State University. Glendale, Arizona.  
 
Miller, J. M., Saunders, K. L., & Farhart, C. E. (2016). Conspiracy endorsement as 
motivated reasoning: The moderating roles of political knowledge and trust. 
American Journal of Political Science, 60(4), 824-844. doi:10.1111/ajps.12234 
 
Pariser, E. (2012). The Filter Bubble: How the new personalized web is changing what 
we read and how we think. London: Penguin Books. 
 
Pentina, I., & Tarafdar, M. (2014). From “information” to “knowing”: Exploring the role 
of social media in contemporary news consumption. Computers in Human 
Behavior, 35(June 2014), 211–223. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2014.02.045 
 
Provost, R., Fawcett, T. (2013). Data science for business. Sebastopool: O’Reilly Media. 
 
Redlawsk, D. P., Civettini, A. J. W., & Emmerson, K. M. (2010). The affective tipping 
point: Do Motivated Reasoners ever "get It"? Political Psychology, 31(4), 563-
593. doi:10.1111/j 
 
Shermer, M. (2012). Believing Brain: From Spiritual Faiths to Political Convictions? 
How We Construct Beliefs and Reinforce Them as Truths. UK: Hachette. 
 
Sindic, D., & Condor, S. (2014). Social Identity Theory and Social Categorisation. In C. 
Kinnvall, T. Capelos, & P. Nesbitt-Larking (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of 
Global Political Psychology (pp. 39–54). UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
   54 
Spivey, M. J., & Dale, R. (2004). On the continuity of mind: Toward a dynamical 
account of account of cognition. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 45(87-
142). doi:10.1016/s0079-7421(03)45003-2 
 
Swami, V. (2012). Social Psychological Origins of Conspiracy Theories: The Case of the 
 Jewish  Conspiracy Theory in Malaysia. Frontiers in Psychology, 3. 
 doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00280 
 
Taber, C., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political 
beliefs. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 755-769. 
doi:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3694247 
 
Tajfel, J., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. The social 
psychology of intergroup relations, 33(47), 74. 
doi:https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226768898 
 
Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & McGarty, C. (1994). Self and collective: 
Cognition and social context. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20(5), 
454-463. doi:10.1177/0146167294205002 
 
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M., Oakes, P. J., & Reicher, D. D. (1987). Rediscovering the social 
group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Turner, J. C., & Reynolds, K. J. (2012). Self-Categorization Theory. In P. A. M. Van 
Lange, A. W. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of Theories of Social 
Psychology (pp. 399-417). London: Sage Publications. 
 
 
Turner, J. C., & Onorato, R. S. (1999). Social identity, personality, and the self-concept: 
A self-categorization perspective. In T. R. Tyler, R. M. Kramer, & O. P. John 
(Eds.), The psychology of the social self (pp. Social identity, personality, and the 
self-concept: A self-categorizing perspective. 
 
Twenge, J. M., Honeycutt, N., Prislin, R., & Sherman, R. A. (2016). More polarized but 
more Independent: Political party identification and ideological self-
categorization among U.S. adults, college students, and late adolescents, 1970-
2015. Personlity and Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(10), 1364-1383. 
doi:10.1177/0146167216660058 
 
van Prooijen, J. W., & Jostmann, N. B. (2013). Belief in conspiracy theories: The 
influence of uncertainty and perceived morality. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 43(1), 109–115. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.1922 
 
Whitson, J. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Lacking Control Increases Illusory Pattern 
   55 
Perception. Sciencie, 322(3), 115–117. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1159845 
 
Winter, B. (2013). Linear models and linear mixed effects models in R with linguistic 
applications. Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/pdf/1308.5499.pdf 
 
Wojnowicz, M. T., Ferguson, M. J., Dale, R., & Spivey, M. J. (2009). The self-
organization of explicit attitudes. Psychological Science, 20(11 November), 1428-
1435. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02448.x  
 
Woltman, H., Feldstain, J., MacKay, C., & Rocchi, M. (2012). An introduction to 
heirarchical linear modeling. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 
8(1), 52-69. doi:10.20982/tqmp.08.1.p052 
 
Zuckerman, A. S. (Ed.) (2005). The social logic of politics: Personal networks as 
contexts for political behavior. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
   56 
APPENDIX A 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION SURVEY 
   57 
   58 
   59 
   60 
   61 
 
  
  
   62 
APPENDIX B 
GENERAL POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE SURVEY 
 
  
   63 
 
 
   64 
 
  
   65 
APPENDIX C 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 
 
  
   66 
   67 
   68 
   69 
 
  
   70 
APPENDIX D 
 
CONSPIRATORIAL STIMLUI SET 
  
 
  
   71 
Republican Party-Aligned, Right-Wing Conspiratorial Statements  
(Against Barack Obama) 
Barack Obama believes in socialism. 
Barack Obama wants to take away Americans' right to own guns. 
Barack Obama is a Muslim. 
Barack Obama disregarded information to prevent the attack on the American 
consulate in Benghazi. 
Barack Obama was born in Kenya.       
Barack Obama wants government-led medical panels to make end-of-life decisions for 
people. 
  
Democrat Party-Aligned, Left-Wing Conspiratorial Statements 
(Against George W. Bush) 
George W. Bush was behind a government plan to deliberately break the levees 
protecting black people during Hurricane Katrina. 
George W. Bush knew that 9/11 was going to happen. 
George W. Bush deliberately lied to get the US to invade Iraq. 
George W. Bush acted as a dictator during his presidency. 
George W. Bush helped plot the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a means to going to war in 
Iraq. 
George W. Bush used fraud to win the 2000 election. 
  
General Knowledge Statements 
(About George W. Bush) 
George W. Bush is married to Michelle Bush. 
George W. Bush has twin boys. 
George W. Bush belongs to the Democratic party. 
George W. Bush once was the governor of Oregon. 
George W. Bush served in the British Royal Army. 
George W. Bush is the grandfather of the current US President. 
  
General Knowledge Statements 
(About Barack Obama) 
Barack Obama is married to Laura Obama. 
Barack Obama has two sons. 
Barack Obama belongs to the Republican party. 
Barack Obama once had a job as a medical doctor. 
Barack Obama is of Asian and European descent. 
Barack Obama once was a Montana United States Senator. 
   72 
General Knowledge Statements 
(About politics) 
Medicare is a private health insurance plan sold to individuals in all 50 states. 
There are two years in one full term of office for U.S. Senators. 
The current vice-president of the United States is Dick Cheney. 
The Democratic Party currently has the most seats in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. 
The Democratic Party is more conservative than the Republican Party. 
The current Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court is Sonia Sotomayor. 
 
General Conspiratorial Statements 
The Apollo moon landings never happened and were staged in a Hollywood film 
studio. 
In 1947, the U.S. military recovered the wreckage of an alien spacecraft from Roswell, 
NM, and covered up the fact. 
U.S. agencies intentionally created the AIDS epidemic and administered it to Black 
and gay men in the 1970s. 
The assassination of John F. Kennedy was not committed solely by Lee Harvey 
Oswald but was rather an organized conspiracy. 
Area 51 in Nevada is a secretive military base that contains hidden alien spacecraft 
and/or alien bodies. 
The assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. was the result of an organized conspiracy 
by U.S. government agencies. 
      
 
